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Abstract
In the aftermath of Cold War, the system of United Nations (UN) Peace Missions 
assumed new proportions, by adjusting the nature of political developments, which 
characterized the international relations stage in this period. In the peace-keeping 
agenda of these missions, special focus was given to issues related to “international 
state-building” in the post-conflict situations, as well as attempts to prevent and 
manage consequences of the state’s failure. In pursuit of these goals and as part of 
this agenda, it is believed that liberal western values, especially as part of the “liberal 
peace thesis”, have become ever more widespread and commonplace. The models of 
state-building,  according  to  this  thesis,  include  combination  of  values  of  liberal 
democracy and principles of the market economy, as precondition to overall social 
development, which would contribute to long-term peace. According to this conception
According to this conception, it is clear that the transitional process from war to peace 
and that of state-building, in addition to the political dimensions, also has significant 
economic dimensions. Therefore, the authors of this study are focused on and aim 
to analyze and explain the role the economic sector plays in the construction and 
functioning of the state system in a post-conflict society, as is the case of Kosovo. At 
the contextual level, the study consists of understanding the role played by UNMIK, 
as international administration, in the direction of this sector. One part of the study 
is dedicated to analysing immediate and long-term strategies and approaches of the 
peacekeeping mission, aimed at reconstruction, i.e. the development of the economic 
sector from scratch, which would impact directly and indirectly on the creation of an 
enabling socio-political environment for a lasting peace.
But the rest of the study focuses on macroeconomic indicators such as GDP level, 
monetary  policy,  as  well  as  import  and  export  situation  (trade  balance,  which 
realistically reflects the current status of economic development in Kosovo, as well as 
for measuring the gap between the expected targets and achieved concrete results. 
This means that these indicators reflect the degree of success or failure of the mission 
in relation to the fulfillment of this objective. Finally, by analysing the previous and 
current results, we will try to explain development trends of Kosovo’s economy in the 
short-term.56     AcAdemicus - internAtionAl scientific JournAl
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Introduction
More prevalent types of conflicts after the Cold War were of ethnic nature, taking 
place more within states rather than between them (Hensel, 2001:4), subsequently dozens 
of serious humanitarian situation were created, the management of which required 
direct interventionist approach by the international community in the internal affairs 
of those countries, as was the case with: Somalia, Rwanda, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Kosovo and East Timor (Luck, 2007:206). In the face of new evolving circumstances in the 
international security environment, via á vis, the UN, as the world’s largest mechanism 
of collective security, undertook concrete steps in assuming new responsibilities for 
addressing and managing conflict situations. Consequently, related to this activity, 
the UN imposed a need to expand the operational instruments and approaches so 
that new peace missions on the ground may be more effective in creating favoruable 
conditions to building a lasting peace.
In this context, former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, in his report of year 2000: 
“We the peoples”, featured a clear distinction between traditional peace operations 
and modern or complex and multidimensional. He stated that: “While traditional 
peacekeeping was mainly focused on monitoring ceasefires; today’s complex peace 
operations  have  very  different  objectives  (Annan,  2000:48)”. These UN peacekeeping 
operations have conducted multidimensional operations, consisting of a wide range 
of components, including military police, political affairs, civil affairs, humanitarian 
affairs, rule of law, human rights, etc (UN Handbook, 2003: 1-2). In functional terms, these 
missions have served various purposes such as election monitoring, demobilization, 
reintegration of ex-combatants, human rights monitoring, de - mining, etc (Kondoch, 
2005:1-19).
Typical  examples  of  multidimensional  missions,  which  can  be  categorized  as  the 
fourth generation (Kondoch, 2005:15-19), may be missions of the United Nations Interim 
Administration  in  Kosovo  (UNMIK,  1999-present)  and  the  United  Nations  Transitional 
Administration  (UNTAET,  1999-2002).  Moreover,  as  can  be  noticed  in  the  following 
peace operations undertaken by the UN, as in these two cases, have been far more 
multidimensional missions compared with the previous three generations. One of the 
key features of this multi-dimensionality, has been expressed by the UN’s cooperation 
with many other international and regional mechanisms (including those of military, 
political and economic), performing multiple functions.
In the theoretical literature, the increased scope of these missions raised the need for 
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the complexity of these activities in a meaningful theoretical way. However, what he 
observes with these multidimensional peacekeeping operations is their responsibility 
for the functioning of the territory or the actual state under administration. Their most 
unique feature is “establishment of temporary structures with broad responsibility 
for the management of public assets and the provision of public services – they 
simply exercise some of the core functions of modern government” (Caplan, 2005:86). 
In  discharging  such  functions,  international  administrations,  as  a  result,  receive 
functions of state authority, becoming equivalent to a typical state government. These 
administrations have, inter alia, the authority to issue and repeal laws, appoint and 
dismiss public officials, then they have direct responsibility for public safety, public 
service delivery, generating revenue from customs and taxes, and developing budget 
and fiscal policy (Coelho, 2008:16), to the extent that some scholars have termed them 
state-building missions (Zervaki, 2008:10).
However, a somewhat clearer definition for the multidimensional character of the 
modern practice of international transitional administrations is provided by Coelho, 
according to which, the administration demonstrate their effectiveness by performing 
dual responsibility: that after having met the initial phase of control over the transition 
trajectory (direct governance), parallel with that, also start building and strengthening 
the internal institutional self-governance capacities, a process which is widely regarded 
as the international state-building (Coelho, 2008:70). This dual mandate, conducted by an 
international administration, consists of and aims to increase the empirical nationhood 
(or the ability of local authorities under administration to effectively govern their 
societies) (Coelho, 2008:18).
In the context of UNMIK administration in Kosovo, there is a wide recognition of the 
fact that the country has been and remains at the spotlight of developments in the 
state-building and sovereignty in recent years (Howard, 2013:1-3), because, as argued by 
Richmond, UNMIK has been the first ever, most ambitious project of state-building 
by UN to date (Richmond & Franks, 2007:1), although this role of UNMIK has not been part 
of its formal mandate (Stahn, 2008:310), i.e. it had not been specified explicitly in its 
legal basis, the Resolution 12441. Therefore, it may be argued that the state-building 
components of UNMIK emerge implicitly from exercise of its legal mandate, which 
was building democratic governing institutions (Coelho, 2008:295), which were later found 
to have served as a basis for strengthening the empirical statehood in Kosovo (Zaum, 
2007:127-140). Or, as Ignatieff argues, UNMIK was basically a state-building mission, 
without recognizing the fact that the ultimate goal was the independence of Kosovo 
(Ignatieff, 2003: 77-109).
1 Resolution 1244 authorized the UN "(...), to establish an international civil presence in Kosovo in order to provide an interim 
administration for Kosovo under which the people of Kosovo can enjoy substantial autonomy within the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia, and which will provide transitional administration while establishing and overseeing the development of provisional 
democratic self-governing institutions to ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants of Kosovo": Resolution 
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Therefore, to understand the state-building component of these peace missions 
or  multidimensional  administrations  in  general  and  the  UNMIK  administration  in 
Kosovo’s case in particular, among the research questions to be raised, the response 
to which triggers considerable debate, include: how state-building is conceived today, 
as an activity carried on by a mission of peace? What elements must contain in itself 
an activity to qualify as a state-building? What constitutes state-building activity, or 
which are priorities and components that make up the state-building? And what are 
the prerequisites that must be met, so that this activity be deemed successful?
How is the state-building conceptualized today, as an activity conducted by a peace 
mission? What elements it needs to contain in order to qualify as a state-building 
activity? What does a state-building activity consist of, or what are the priorities and 
components that constitute state-building? What are requirements to be met in order 
for it qualify as successful? 
Methodology
Although  researchers  generally  argue  that  qualitative  methods  should  be  used 
for  study  of  social  and  political  phenomena  (Matthews  &  Ross,  2009:  95-105), however, 
depending on the nature of the problems that are studied, it is very important to 
use a quantitative methodological framework. Therefore, as this study deals with a 
diversified group of issues of political and economic nature, it is necessary to use a 
combined multidisciplinary methodology, comprising both qualitative and quantitative 
methods. Among the qualitative methods applied in this study are mostly explanatory 
and comparative methods. On the other hand, quantitative methodological framework 
will be focused on using statistical and econometric methods.
This  study,  in  terms  of  research  proceedings,  will  be  characterized  by  an  initial 
heuristic approach, to finally move towards using an inductive approach. Thus, starting 
from an overview of the issues that characterize the new state-building UN peace 
missions, the overview will be intertwined with an analysis of the economic activity of 
state-building agendas of these missions. Indeed, the view is further distinguished 
in analysing key macroeconomic indicators of a country under administration, which 
enable measuring and extracting conclusions about the performance of this activity 
within these missions.
Scientific debates about the international state-building according to liberal 
peace thesis 
It  is  estimated  that  among  the  biggest  challenges  on  the  agenda  of  global 
decision-making centres, in the beginning of XXI century, undoubtedly are matters 
relating  to  state-building,  particularly  in  post-conflict  situation  (Chandler,  2004:70). 
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plan, it is argued that state-building is one of the most challenging and also the most 
important for the international community (Fukuyama, 2010:17). This importance, under 
this plan, can be explained under the approach “Outside looking inside”, which in 
terms of security meant an eventual threat to international security will come directly 
from insecurity within states, especially those that are fragile and tend to fail (Tansey, 
2006:1).
But in addition to these findings, a challenge in itself for the international community 
remains a clarification of the standard agenda of priorities, which should be implemented, 
in order to deliver a successful state-building effort. This is made clear, especially given 
that the literature and theoretical debates do not contain a clear list of priorities, 
standards and components that must be met by an international administration with 
state-building mission. This results from the fact that the territories or societies where 
such missions are carried out, are characterized by different socio-political and unique 
historical circumstances that any standard criteria of state-building are simply out of 
the question. But despite this, some authors have somewhat similar views on what 
components can be implemented as a ma tter of priority on the ground. For example, 
researchers (Raris and Sisk, 2009:15; Zaum, 2007:127; Chandler, 2006: 98-101; Coelho, 2008:296) who have 
promoted the modern theories related to state - building, generally cite a list of four 
main priorities. These priorities consist of components, upon the fulfilment of which 
is deemed to produce a successful state-building mission, thus strengthening the 
empirical statehood in the territory or society under the international administration. 
The areas primarily deemed a priority by the international community, which must be 
implemented in societies that aim to strengthen the empirical statehood correspond 
to typical tasks of a modern state. Namely, these involve the components of security, 
order and justice, institution building and economic reconstruction and development. 
Therefore, these components are essential prerequisites that must be functional in 
societies which aim to consolidate and strengthen their empirical statehood (Raris and 
Sisk, 2009:15), or even with those who risk forfeiting this nationality, as it has previously 
been functional.
This  state-building  components  are  also  contained  in  the  definition  on 
state-building provided by Chesterman. According to him, state-building entails “a 
broader international involvement directed at building or reconstruction competent 
governance institutions in order to guarantee physical and economic security as well 
as support in developing a range of economic, political and security areas” (Chesterman, 
2004:5). Furthermore, Fukuyama’s classification may also match this definition, according 
to which “three are three aspects or phases of state-building” (Fukuyama, 2010:150). The 
first is related to immediate security and reconstruction issues in the post-war period, 
such as the case of Afghanistan, Kosovo and Somalia. The second phase is related to 
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and functionalization of state, which means a sustainable economy and a functioning 
civil society, etc. 
Following this more or less consensual line of qualification of these priorities that make 
up a state-building agenda, we can conclude that among the main components that 
covered the process of state-building in Kosovo, led by UNMIK, were also those list 
above. But, for simplicity of analysis, only components of reconstruction and economic 
development will be analysed in this study, profiled by conceptions of liberal peace 
thesis, which aims to promote democratization and the establishment of a market 
economy, as well as a strong role for civil society and the private sector (Knudsen, 2010:24) 
(the so-called Washington consensus), as the best guarantor of peace and stability in 
post-conflict societies (Wennmann, 2010:6). Moreover, in the contemporary debate about 
state-building, as a factor for a lasting peace, it is believed that the combination of 
democratic and economic values in conformity with liberal ideals, may serve as an 
efficient tool in the eradication of conflicting factors. Therefore, in the majority of 
international administrations, their agendas have been dominated with goals related 
to recovery and development of the economic sector, as a prerequisite for a lasting 
peace (Knudsen, 2010:24).
Strategic approach of UNMIK in building the reconstruction and economic 
development component 
Already, it has been found that the transitional process from war to peace as well as 
the peace-building has distinct economic and transformational dimensions (Raris and 
Sisk, 2009:129). This becomes clear especially in view of the standard practices, which 
believes that a society may not be self-government if it does not possess necessary 
resources  to  generate  revenues  in  order  to  support  the  functionalization  of  its 
institutions. Here the support implies funding the expenses for all services provided 
by the governing state administration of the country. This means that in the absence 
of  institutional  infrastructure  that  would  generate  a  sustainable  and  productive 
economy, no transformational processes can occur in the society and consequently 
no structural changes (Raris and Sisk, 2009:129).
 Also in the context of Kosovo’s administration, the transitional process to a market 
economy  was  an  essential  element  of  the  state-building  effort  of  UNMIK  (Zaum, 
2007:153). This duty of the UNMIK authority was managed by the European Union (EU) 
through Pillar IV (ICG, 2001:12)2. Concretely, the aim of the Pillar IV was to effect a general 
upgrade of legal and institutional economic infrastructure in Kosovo. This structural 
and infrastructural change was conceived to create opportunities to functionalize a 
competitive and effective market economy in Kosovo. Moreover, with the introduction 
2 After the internal structural reorganization of UNMIK in January 2000, Pillars I and II were led by UN, Pillar III by OSCE and 
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of commercial legislation in conformity with its standards, the EU aimed to promote 
economic development but, at the same time, commence the privatization process 
in Kosovo (Richmond & Franks, 2007:4). However, irrespective of these plans and goals, 
the establishment and strengthening of this state-building component, as EU’s 
responsibility, was immediately understood as a difficult job right at the start, as the 
Kosovo’s economy in 1999 was completely destroyed and everything had to start from 
scratch (Kundse, 2010:12). 
The  decisive  elements  which  were  part  of  the  overall  international  strategy  for 
rehabilitation and development of Kosovar economy, mainly consist of emergency 
assistance and reconstruction; establishment of an institutional and legal framework; 
commercialization  and  privatization  of  socially-owned  enterprises  and  promote 
development of private sector (Knudsen, 2010:12).
Reconstruction.  In  1999,  the  main  focus  of  the  international  community  and  its 
programs  was  oriented  more  towards  “reconstruction  rather  than  economic 
development” (Richmond & Franks, 2007:16). This becomes clear, particularly in view of the 
fact that 70% of total international funding, coming from EU countries, and coordinated 
by the European Commission, had reconstruction as its main objective in relation to 
development goals. Responsible for the management of the main EU assistance in 
Kosovo, was the European Agency for Reconstruction (EAR), which although in itself 
a funding agency of the EU was nonetheless detached from Pillar IV. For example, 
in terms of numbers, EAR in the period from 2000-2001 had been managing 547 
million EUR (ICG, 2001:13).Therefore, seeing a totally dilapidated infrastructure of the 
Kosovar economy, EAR focused on setting up and functioning of this infrastructure. 
Specifically, it focused on operationalization of the “energy sector, housing, transport 
and water supply, as well as agriculture support projects, enterprise development, 
health, and local government/civil society” (ICG, 2001:114). In fact, the international 
project of state-building in Kosovo, in terms of investment per capita, was one of the 
most comprehensive to date (Knudsen, 2010:10).
One notable feature that should be noted, in relation to reconstruction support is 
that bulk of donations from various organizations were dedicated to and tailored for 
management of emergency assistance rather than development. Only after the year 
2000  (ICG, 2001:13) did the emergency assistance turn into development assistance. 
Therefore,  although  considerable  international  economic  resources  were  made 
available to Kosovo during this period, economic development (beyond reconstruction 
of physical infrastructure and macroeconomic framework) became a UNMIK policy 
only at later stages. For example, from the substantive point of view, the regular report 
of the UNMIK in June of 2003 by Secretary General Annan, until paragraph 42 there is 
no details that would indicate a concrete strategic plan of UNMIK, which would relate 
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However, one problem did accompany external international donor assistance was 
the lack to deliver all assistance pledged. Nonetheless, the gap between the pledged 
and actual assistance kept decreasing by the year. For example, in the period between 
June 1999 and late 2003 it is estimated that Kosovo received technical assistance of 
around 742 million EUR or 29% of donor commitments. In time, specifically in 2004, 
technical assistance was estimated at 71% of all donor commitments (or 46% of all 
donations in year 2004)  (The World Bank, 2006:15). A breakdown of foreign investment 
by sectors of Kosovar economy is given below: public services 26%, housing 16%, 
economy, unemployment, trade and industry 13%, education and health 9%, transport 
and infrastructure 6%, police and justice 5%, democratic governance and civil society 
5%, agriculture 4%, social welfare 3%, other 13% (The World Bank, 2006:16).
After  this,  the  strong  international  support  during  the  first  five  years  before  the 
external  intervention  in  Kosovo  changed  substantially  from  emergency  assistance 
to long-term assistance for reconstruction and development. Concrete change was 
introduced after 2003 whereby after the Thessaloniki Summit, the EU would assume 
primary responsibility for economic and financial assistance for all Western Balkans 
countries, including Kosovo. This EU strategy was harmonized as part of mechanisms 
under  Stability  Pact  for  Southeast  Europe”  and  “Stabilization  and  Association 
Agreement”. Therefore, in relation to Kosovo, the burden of economic assistance 
would be transferred from UN programmes to EU (Narten, 2009:146). 
Institutional and legal infrastructure. To accomplish the objective of recovery and 
development of destroyed Kosovar economy, UNMIK, through its Pillar IV, established 
the following institutions in the economic and financial administration. First, the Banking 
and Payments Authority of Kosovo (BPK) was established, which in a way, performed 
the role of the Kosovo central bank, as it assumed responsibility for licencing all financial 
institutions,  along  with  responsibility  and  authority  over  establishing  a  banking 
system in conformity with the market economy. In the meantime, the Department 
of Reconstruction was also established, which was responsible for monitoring and 
coordinating the EU activities as part of Pillar IV. In addition to these two institutions 
in the economic area, Central Fiscal Authority (CFA) was also functioning at the time, 
which incorporated a budget office, tax administration as well as customs services. 
The list of these institutions was expanded with the Department of Public Services 
(DPS) and Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) (Narten, 2009:12). All these institutions 
were  covering,  to  a  large  extent,  the  functioning  of  the  institutional  economic 
infrastructure of a typical society, newly emerged from war and under international 
administration. Furthermore, in relation to establishment of these institutions, in his 
assessments, Stahn went as far as concluding that in so doing, UNMIK had established 
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When it comes to analysing issues related to economic development, undoubtedly 
the most important factors for creating this sector of Kosovo after the war were the 
foreign investments and donations of international organizations. However, it was clear 
that every orientation of investors and external donations to Kosovo were shrouded 
in two-fold insecurity: the first related to lack of Kosovo’s sovereignty and the other 
failure to specify policies for final resolution of its status. These two uncertainties were 
inevitably reflected in a sense of insecurity among investors. 
In  this  regard,  in  the  absence  of  a  long-term  jurisdictional  basis,  in  terms  of 
providing legal guarantees for foreign investors and temporal uncertainty regarding 
the resolution of Kosovo’s status, alternative ways were devised to provide a kind 
temporary security. An example in this context would be the practice followed by 
the World Bank, which justified its activities by relying on the fact that, as Kosovo 
was administered by UNMIK, whose mandate was based on a UN document such as 
the Resolution 1244, it was therefore possible to provide assistance to this country 
(ICG, 2001:16-17). Therefore, in the face of such a challenge, over time, UNMIK began to 
address the issue by adopting a considerable number of regulations, which enhanced 
the legal and institutional infrastructure for economic development.
Privatization and commercialization. Privatization, as a “fundamentally political” issue 
became an economic strategy of the international state-building project, by advancing 
it throughout the world as a self-evident component of the liberal peace thesis (Knudsen, 
2010:10). In addition, in terms of relevance, it was believed that privatization should 
be at the top of neo-liberal economic reform efforts (Perritt, 2004:287). On this basis, it 
was found that the involvement of international community, through UNMIK, in the 
privatization process in Kosovo was a clear example of international state-building, 
whereby one of the key goals was to build and functionalize the economy on the 
neo-liberal principles.
Among the first steps to have been undertaken for privatization and commercialization 
in Kosovo by the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) as the responsible authority, 
was to register and begin the privatization of socially-owned enterprises (SOE). At 
the beginning of UNMIK’s mission, there were around 350 SOEs with over 60,000 
employees (ICG, 2001:19) that could be privatized. This process, nonetheless, constituted 
a serious challenge, as in addition to having to go through a difficult transition of 
economic sector reforms, from a planned economy to market economy, the challenge 
was made even more complex as the ownership over these enterprises was unclear: 
Provisional Institutions of Self-Government (PISG), UNMIK, or FRY. This came as a result 
of uncertainties surrounding Kosovo’s future status as well as reference territorial 
integrity and sovereignty of FRY over Kosovo referred to in Resolution. This issue, 
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With reference to Resolution 1244, FRY threatened law suits against any potential 
investor, if UNMIK were to continue the further sale of SOEs. For these reasons, 
international efforts to privatize the SOEs were terminated. This political situation, 
with such legal problems resulted in reluctance of foreign investors to take chances 
with their investments in a territory “plagued by uncertainty” (Coelho, 2008:363). However, 
in spite of these challenges, international lawyers of the western countries promoted 
a different approach to privatizing SOEs in Kosovo. For example, UNMIK Pillar IV 
established the Kosovo Trust Agency (KTA) on 13 June 2002. KTA was properly staffed 
and fully jurisdiction, separate from UNMIK, in order to alleviate the risk of liability 
associated with UN. KTA had the authority to administer the SOEs and conducted the 
privatization through two methods: “spin-off” and “liquidation” (Knoll, 2005:652).
Furthermore, an additional way to overcome the legal obstructions of the privatization 
process was introduced by the Department of Trade and Industry through the 
application of so-called “commercialization”, as a temporary recovery stage of SOEs. 
Through this approach, various companies operating in relevant sectors may enter into 
“managerial contracts” that allowed them a type of ownership over these enterprises, 
without prejudice to “final ownership” (ICG, 2001:20).
Macroeconomic indicators of UNMIK performance in the economic development 
of Kosovo 
To assess UNMIK’s performance regarding Kosovo’s economic development, it is 
necessary to do so in the light of analysis of macroeconomic indicators, through which 
we can conclude easier if the performance of the mission was successful or not as a 
result of this activity. Thus, among the most important macroeconomic indicators are: 
GDP level, unemployment and living standards, as well as import and export situation 
(trade balance).
GDP-According to some estimates, gross domestic production (GDP) in Kosovo, during 
the immediate post - war period, recorded a good growth trend relative to the later 
period, where the trend of growth has been slightly diminished. For example, in 
November 2000, GDP was 3 billion Deutsche Mark (DM) or about 1,400 DM per capita. 
These figures, compared with those of 1999, showed a significant increase compared 
to 840 DM per capita, in November 1999 (ICG, 2001:2). Over time, during the period 
2004-2008, GDP in Kosovo increased from 2,912.5 million EUR to 3,851.4 million EUR. 
GDP per capita increased from 1,473 EUR in 2004 to 1,612 EUR in 2007 (Enti i Statistikave 
të Kosovës, 2008:60). However, in spite of significant GDP growth rate per capita, its level 
remained much lower compared to the growth of GDP per capita in neighbouring 
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Unemployment and living standards. Analysing these indicators, it is clear that the 
most problematic issue that accompanied economic development process in Kosovo 
has been associated with high poverty levels, which had been the result of high 
unemployment. In fact this has been the most sensitive point for critics of principals of 
liberal peace of UNMIK’s economic development agenda (Richmond & Franks, 2007:9). The 
following data represent an alarming situation, where high levels of poverty are tied 
to high level of unemployment. For example, it is estimated that the unemployment 
rate in Kosovo during UNMIK administration ranged between 30% - 50%. In 2001, the 
unemployment rate was around 49%, but fell to about 30% in 2004 (Kosovo Conflict Report, 
2006:4), showing a marked increase in 2008, where it amounted to 40% (RIINVEST, 2007:58). 
As a result of this high level of unemployment, the proportion of the population living 
in poverty has risen steadily from 37% to 44% in the period between 2000-2004 
(RIINVEST, 2007:57), while in 2006 poverty rate reached 48%, with 12-18% of people living 
in extreme poverty, a trend that remained steady by 2008 (UNDP, 2012:11).
Balance of exports and imports (trade balance) - In addition to these indicators, the 
import and export analysis indicate that Kosovo applied a completely liberalized trade 
regime during its direct administration by UNMIK (1999-2008), without restrictions 
on import and export, but also without any incentives for export. Moreover, analysis 
of import - export ratios indicate that the trade balance during this time was negative 
(RIINVEST, 2002:24). Even import analysis indicates that Kosovo, due to the collapse of 
its economy from the war, imports almost all consumer goods and raw materials. 
Dependence on imports, however, began to fall only when domestic production was 
slightly stimulated by foreign investment. But notwithstanding, the dependence on 
imports remained high at all times, even when local economy began to show some 
signs of growth. In fact, this growth also affected the increase in imports. Expressed 
in figures, the increase in imports, for example in the period 2005-2008, ranged from 
1.16 to 1.93 million EUR, or 66.6% (World Bank, 2009:1). On the other hand, while imports 
were quite strong, exports in the post - war Kosovo were almost inexistent. Over 
time, a very slight incentive was noted only after the privatization of some of the 
leading manufacturing enterprises, such as “Feronikeli”, which immediately recorded 
a sharp increase in exports, but never exceeding more than 6% of Gross Domestic 
Product. A significant increase was achieved between 2005 and 2008, where exports 
increased from 56 million EUR to 199 million EUR, an increase of 253% (World Bank, 
2009:2) but nevertheless accounting for only 10.3% of the total import (World Bank, 2009). 
Consequently, this situation resulted in a mostly negative trade balance of Kosovo 
during UNMIK’s administration (Trade Policy of Kosovo, 2009).
Therefore, on the basis of the realistic picture presented by these macroeconomic 
indicators it is possible to also make an assessment of the developmental performance 
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The fact that UNMIK made an attempt at structuring and developing the Kosovar 
economy in conformity with the principles of the liberal peace thesis, led certain 
scholars, especially those critical of the principles of the these thesis, to make an 
evaluation over differences between expectations and results achieved concretely by 
UNMIK in relation to developing a sustainable economy in Kosovo during the period 
1999-2008.
From general perspective, especially in terms of specific macroeconomic indicators, 
a large gap was found between these expectations and results on the ground (Sen & 
Kirkpatrick, 2009:2-3). This fact led the critics of this thesis to address a number of challenges 
that the international community faced and which, according to them, have not been 
avoided to a satisfactory degree. According to Richmond, economic development in 
Kosovo was a far cry from matching the principles of liberal peace thesis. Specifically, 
the international community is deemed to have failed in Kosovo due to its insistence 
on profound and hasty transformation of economic infrastructure, in order to move 
from a socialist centralized economy to a capitalist model, under the rules of market 
economy  (Richmond  &  Franks,  2007:16-17). Furthermore, Richmond connects this failure 
to political reasons, which mainly related to lack of a strategy by UNMIK to resolve 
Kosovo’s political status. In his view, it was clear that the economic development of 
Kosovo was caught in a rather paradoxical situation: “no development without status 
and no status without development” (Richmond & Franks, 2007:16).
What then was the development status of the Kosovar economy after the resolution 
of its political status (independence) in 2008?
Current development context in Kosovo and forecasts for the short-term future. 
After the independence of Kosovo, UNMIK’s powers, including those for management of 
economic sector, were reduced drastically and this role was, almost in full, transferred to 
Kosovo institutions. In these circumstances, it seemed that political obstacles believed 
to have prevented economic development of Kosovo were overcome. However, at this 
time, it did not seem as if there would be a steady progress in economic development. 
The trend of economic growth remained anaemic for a while, until Kosovo was also 
able to join the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and The World Bank (WB), as well as 
several other regional economic institutions. In these newly-prevalent circumstances, 
Kosovo gradually began to consolidate its status and legitimacy in the sense of being 
equal to other countries in the region and record some positive achievements in 
economic development (KIPRED, 2013:4). Notwithstanding, Kosovo has never managed 
to become an equal trade and economic partner to those countries, either because of 
the fragility of its statehood, or because of its small economic impact on the region. 
This is because Kosovo’s economic size accounts for only 0.43% of the total economy 
of the region, or represents less than 1/20 of it (KIPRED, 2013:4).B. BAshotA, Y. selA, f. ismAili - economic overview of the internAtionAl stAte-Building of Kosovo   67
However, despite the slight transitory progress of the Kosovar economy during these 
five years (2008-2013), the main development sources for Kosovar economy remain 
mostly unsustainable. They are primarily made of public  expenditure,  diaspora 
remittances and international financial assistance, which account for 20% of the GDP 
(FES & RIINVEST, 2011:2). In addition, in a more complete reflection of current economic 
performance of Kosovo, we need to analyse main macroeconomic indicators, which 
represent an unstable situation in regards to sustainable economic development. 
Table 1 below provides an macroeconomic overview of the realistic situation of the 
Kosovo economy.
Selected indicators 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Real growth of GDP (%) 3.5 3.2 4.4 2.5 3.1
GDP (million €) 4007.8 4291.1 4769.8 4916.4 -
Inflation (annual average) -2.4 3.5 7.3 2.5 1.8
Credits (million €) 1289 1458.7 1698.1 1763.4 1805.8
Deposits (million €) 1744.8 1936.9 2104 2279 2449.0
Exports (million €) 165.3 295.9 319.2 276.1 293.9
Imports (million €) 1935.5 2157.7 2492.3 2507.6 2450.4
Table 1. Main macroeconomic indicators in Kosovo 2009-2013.3
GDP. The actual growth of GDP for 2013 is believed to have reached 3.1%, which 
is  higher  than  2012,  but  lower  than  the  first  three  years  of  the  independence, 
2009-2011 (KCB, 2013:4), and much lower compared to year 2008, where growth of GDP 
exceeded 5.4%. Regardless, it is believed that the economy of Kosovo still represents 
an issue and a considerable threat to long-term political stability of the country (UNDP, 
About Kosovo). In view of this growth rate, Kosovo ranks 93rd in the world, which in 
relation to the neighbouring countries, it is ranked behind Macedonia, Albania, Serbia 
and  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina,  etc  (USAID,  2014:1-2), only outperforming Montenegro. 
Also, during this period, the slow GDP growth rate was dependent on remittances 
and external financial assistance. For example, in 2011, 19% of GDP (a rather high 
deficit), was funded by external financial assistance and remittances. As they mostly 
come from the Western Europe, both of these sources are deemed fragile and are 
dependent on the economic crisis of the region; and when they retina a stable level, 
only around 11% are used for investment, the rest being diverted to consumption 
(USAID, 2014:1-2).
Unemployment and the standard of living. From macroeconomic perspective, the 
unemployment and poverty indicators represent perhaps the most realistic situation 
of the economic development in Kosovo. In fact, the poverty rate is in direct connection 
3 Source: Central Bank of Kosovo and Kosovo Statistical Agency (2003).68     AcAdemicus - internAtionAl scientific JournAl
to high unemployment. The unemployment rate in Kosovo is at present 35.1%. From 
gender perspective, 40.7% of unemployed are male and 56.4% are female, while 
60.2% of those are young (age 15 to 24 years). Therefore, the poverty rate in Kosovo 
is very high at 29.7%. Although there was a gradual improvement to the standard of 
living, it only moved arithmetically. The Human Development Index saw a very slight 
increase. In 2007, it was recorded at 0.678 to only rise to 0,700 in 2010, and 0,714 
in 2012. It, nonetheless, remains the lowest in the region (UNDP About Kosovo) and 
Europe (World Bank, 2014:7). 
The export and import status (trade balance) - In time, especially during the period 
2009 to 2013, Kosovo exports have seen a continuous growth. From 165.3 million EUR 
in 2009 they increased to 293.9 million EUR in 2013. However, the rate of export fails 
to come even close to high import rate, creating thereby an alarming negative trade 
deficit. Incentives to exports have been rather pale, as the local production capacity 
during the period could not meet the internal consumption demand, let alone export. 
In relation to GDP, Kosovo imports account for 50% of the GDP, while exports account 
for only 6% of GDP (European Commission, 2013:2).
When it comes to efforts to analyse the short-term development prospects of the 
Kosovar economy, the best approach in this regard would have to be based on analysing 
internal and external economic contextual factors. This approach would allow for 
more objective forecast. For example, the internal factors may include reference to 
development trend of the past five years. Therefore, as the development trend of the 
past five years was rather inconsistent, the trend may be expect to exhibit the same 
traits for the coming five-year period as well. Therefore, the actual indicators of the 
status of the Kosovar economy indicate that the average rate of economic growth 
in Kosovo was 3.5%, which represents a rather large gap between the growth rate 
of Kosovo economy and the other countries of the southeast Europe (USAID, 2014:2). 
Moreover, according to the World Bank assessment, Kosovo requires a growth rate 
of 8-10% annually in order to match the penultimate country of Europe, Albania by 
2020 (FES & RIINVEST, 2011: 2). Therefore, the internal contextual indicators point to rather 
meagre  expectations  of  economic  development.  In  terms  of  external  contextual 
factors, the growth is also expected to be moderate, especially in view of aggravated 
economic prospects of Europe and the global economic slowdown (United Nations, 2014 
p.iii). Furthermore, IMF also points to a modest and steady growth, which in its report, 
provided some possible estimates of key macroeconomic indicators for the period 
between 2014-2018. These estimates are provided in Table 2.B. BAshotA, Y. selA, f. ismAili - economic overview of the internAtionAl stAte-Building of Kosovo   69
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Projections based on Kosovo authorities and IMF staff (Real growth, percent)
Consumtion 3.0 3.3 3.3 2.9 3.1
Invesment 3.4 5.2 7.9 7.5 6.4
Exports 12.1 11.8 11.7 9.7 9.2
Imports 4.4 5.5 6.3 5.7 5.2
GDP 4.2 4.5 5.0 4.5 4.5
Memorandum item 
(GDP millions of €)
5588 5959 6383 6806 7251
Table 2. Forecast real growth in the economy of Kosovo, 2014-2018.4
In view of sombre development short-term prospects there are some recommendations 
of  the  potential  strategy  to  be  adopted,  in  order  to  ensure  a  more  sustainable 
long-term economic growth. The recommendations mostly consist of using the factors 
and resources of the Kosovar economy that provide a comparative, or even absolute 
advantage, compared to the neighbouring countries and the region. For example, as 
Kosova is believed to have the youngest population in Europe, large natural resources 
as well as trade and economic access to a large EU market of 500 million inhabitants, 
it has been recommended that sustainable growth will be achieved if all these factors 
and  potential  development  resources  are  unblocked,  made  of  human  resources, 
unexploited natural resources and private sector development (ECIKS, 2013:6).
Conclusion
In view of the UNMIK’s state-building effort and especially the reconstruction and 
economic development component discussed above, some findings about this mission 
may be drawn; namely, the mission in general contributed to a rather developed 
and  effective  institutional  infrastructure  in  Kosovo,  especially  considering  that  it 
started everything from scratch. However, largest issues also derived from the legal 
infrastructure. The most serious challenge in this sense relates to failure to define the 
final status. Furthermore, issues arising amidst the uncertainties surrounding the final 
Kosovo status have produced the largest impact on the privatization process. 
Also, leaving the issue of Kosovo’s final status open generated direct implications 
on the economic and reconstruction effort of UNMIK. This issue jeopardized the 
prospects of political and economic progress. In addition, uncertainties surrounding 
the political status of Kosovo became a large obstacle to the latter, for membership 
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into international financial institutions or for attracting foreign investments. The cost 
of this “political and economic concept” reached alarming proportions, especially 
when  considering  the  relevance  of  these  factors  in  promoting  employment  and 
poverty reduction.
With regards to UNMIK’s policies on sustainable economic development in Kosovo, 
it may be stated that these were primarily of an “infusionist” nature. These policies 
were geared more towards reconstruction rather than creating a basis for sustainable 
economic development. Therefore, based on these UNMIK policies, we may conclude 
that the only development component of the Kosovar economy was reconstruction, 
i.e. “reconstruction as development”. 
Seen  from  a  general  perspective,  based  on  the  main  macroeconomic  indicators 
of the Kosovar economy, we may conclude that there was a large gap between 
the expectations and the results in the field in terms of establishing a sustainable 
economic development framework in line with the principles of liberal peace. It is this 
fact that has drawn most criticism of the poor performance of UNMIK, which did not 
correspond to principles of the liberal peace thesis. 
Therefore, this poor development and economic performance of Kosovar economy 
presented a direct obstruction to improving the status of Kosovo economy in the 
five years after the independence. Even when a slight progress in development of 
Kosovar economy was noted, the main resources for development of the Kosovo 
economy remain mostly unsustainable. Therefore, in view of the current economic 
situation in Kosovo, it may be stated that the prospects for a sustainable economic 
development of the country will remain lacklustre and in order to ensure a sustainable 
growth, investment must be made to utilize all factors and resources which create a 
comparable advantage to Kosovo. 
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